Silvio Berlusconi with an unprecedentedly large majority in both the Chamber (54.6 percent of seats) and the Senate (55.2 percent). On paper this could stand as the "most cohesive government coalition in the history of the Second Republic" (Chiaramonte and D'Alimonte 2012: 262) . On these bases, the Fourth Berlusconi cabinet was generally expected to be stable and durable. Yet this proved not to be the case due to a number of concurrent factors. In the meantime, the international economic crisis was significantly worsening. As a result of the aggravation of the Greek situation, the financial markets grew increasingly skeptical of the sovereign debt of Southern European countries. Italy got immediately in the focus of financial markets, as testified by the massive growth of the spread (i.e., the difference in terms of interest rate paid to investors by the decennial German bonds and Italian BTPs).
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The combination of a weak government and a weakening economic situation fostered the perception that only a cabinet of national unity could face the course of events (ibid.).
It is against this background that the Chamber of Deputies was called on November 8 th , 2011 to vote on a relatively unimportant budget bill as a means to test the strength of Berlusconi's parliamentary majority. Only 308 MPs (i.e., less than 50 percent) voted in favor.
The very same day, Silvio Berlusconi announced his intention to resign right after the approval of the financial stability law. President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano received the official resignation on November 12 th and the very same day invited Senator Mario Monti to form a national unity government aimed at saving the country from the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The Monti government -a technocratic cabinet composed entirely of unelected professionals and intellectuals -was presented on November 16 th . With the support of all parties represented in parliament except Lega Nord, both the Senate and the Chamber passed motions of confidence in support of Monti's government on November 17 th and 18 th respectively.
Overall, Mario Monti's cabinet succeeded in its goal of putting under control the financial situation of the country and restoring the financial markets' confidence in the Italian debt. Throughout 2012, the spread between German and Italian bonds went progressively down and eventually stabilized below the critical value of 300. In spite of its success in terms of public finance and international reputation, by the end of 2012 the Monti cabinet lost the support of its largest parliamentary party (Silvio Berlusconi's PdL) that abandoned the governing majority on December 6 th . Two days after, Mario Monti announced that he would resign after the approval of the financial stability law for the year 2013. He did so on December 21 st , just one day before the dissolution of the XVI legislature and the call for new elections.
3
Among the issues that the Monti cabinet was unable to tackle, it must be highlighted the reform of the electoral system. As a matter of fact, the declared willingness of all parties to replace the current electoral law did not result in a sufficiently large consensus on any of the potential alternatives on the table.
Parties and Candidates
The electoral system-driven mechanism of awarding the absolute majority of seats to the party (or parties) able to gain the relative majority of votes provides strong incentives to the formation of pre-electoral coalitions (for a better discussion of the Italian electoral law, see: 
The campaign
In line with the mediatization trend common to all advanced industrial democracies, the campaign took place mostly in the media -with television playing a major role. As in 2008, no leaders' debate took place due to a number of cross-vetoes and a generalized disagreement on how many leaders were supposed to take part in the debate. Party leaders enjoyed nonetheless a high visibility in the traditional media. This was especially the case for Berlusconi and Monti, while Bersani's strategy of de-personalizing the campaign message (as testified, among others, by the exclusion of his name from the party symbol) resulted in a significantly lower coverage (ComPol, 2013) . Grillo was also underrepresented in news coverage, partly due to the inherently internet-based nature of the M5S but also because of his leader's open aversion for traditional Italian media (which were not even allowed to film his rallies in proximity of the stage).
According to many observers, the event that marked the beginning of the actual campaign is Silvio Berlusconi's appearance in Michele Santoro's talk show Servizio Pubblico on January 10 th . In this occasion, Berlusconi acted aggressively and already hinted at the strategy he then pursued with vigor throughout the campaign: extensive presence in the media dressed with 'shock' proposals in order to remobilize his traditional base of supporters The campaign dynamics are well exemplified in the trends of daily polls presented in Figure 1 . Survey evidence highlights the initial lead of Bersani's coalition as a result of the primary elections (above 40 percent in the first weeks of December). As said, the progressive decline of the centre-left throughout time can be ascribed in part to its weak campaign strategy. However, the entrance of other contenders in the contest must be taken into account as well. Monti's coalition grew substantially during the holidays, while Berlusconi's upsurge started right after then. Nevertheless, on February 8 th (i.e., the last day before the black-out of polls) the centre-left coalition still seemed to enjoy a relatively safe margin of 5 percentage points on Berlusconi's centre-right coalition. On these bases, the general perception among the electorate was a more or less clear victory for the coalition led by Pier Luigi Bersani. The PD lost about 30 percent of the votes almost uniformly throughout the country but with stronger peaks in the southern regions (-37 percent). Even worse was the performance of the PdL, which lost in five years more than 6 million votes (-46 percent). These extremely poor results can be imputed to the inability of these parties to both remobilize their core voters and/or attract new ones. According to Vezzoni (2013) The lack of attractiveness of the main coalitions represents in turn one of the keys to understand the success of M5S. Preliminary evidence found that roughly two thirds of the votes gained by Grillo's movement came (in relatively equal measure) from former voters of the two main coalitions (Demos 2013). The territorial factor is very important: the support of the M5S is in fact substantially uniform across the country whereas the main coalitions lost more votes exactly where they used to be stronger (Boeri and Nannicini 2013) . The M5S did not only fish into the traditional geographical bowls of established parties, but also among the social bases of their consensus. As pointed out by Diamanti (2013b) a wide majority of voters 'on the run' belonging respectively to the historically aligned productive sectors (entrepreneurs and autonomous workers for the centre-right, white collars and professionals for the centre-left) resorted indeed to the M5S.
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The main coalitions maintained their strength only amongst the unproductive strata of the population (housewives for the centre-right and pensioners for the centre-left), whereas the electorate of the M5S shows a clear dominance of younger voters. The M5S would appear to be the only political force whose support comes for less than 50% (i.e., 43%) from people younger than 45 years-old -the figure for centre-right and centre-left being 60 and 65 percent respectively (Vezzoni 2013 ).
The aftermath
The problematic nature of the electoral outcome resulted in a correspondingly long process of government formation that took over 2 months. This formally started three weeks after the April 28 th Napolitano appointed PD's deputy party leader, Enrico Letta, at the head of another unity government involving political personalities from PD, PdL and SC. The extent to which this government will be able to last in time remains to be seen. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Enrico Letta made clear the political connotation of his government by openly pointing (already in his inaugural address) to a time horizon of years rather than months. However, such an attempt does not entirely eradicate the widespread perception of the new government as a sort of follow-up to the previous one led by Mario Monti. Indeed, the parties supporting Letta's government are virtually the same and so remain the differences among coalition parties in terms of policy positions over several key issues. In the long run, this is likely to provide ground for Beppe Grillo's movement to grow further in electoral terms, with established parties behaving as forecasted by the M5S leader and, in doing so, fostering the perception of changing things so everything stays the same.
Conclusions
The Italian election of February 2013 was held in the context of a generalized erosion of consensus for established parties across the continent (Dinas and Rori, 2013; Quinn, 2011) .
Its peculiarity, however, lies in the fact that such erosion was so vast in magnitude to even challenge the established pattern of bipolar competition to which the country was used to since 1994. The composition of the new parliament highlights a system of three equally powerful extremes, the respective size of which prevents the formation of any political majority without the consent of at least two of the three main political players. Such result is likely to bear a strong impact on the patterns of political competition in the country. The M5S represents the biggest challenge so far to the system's bipolar dynamic by its ability to attract voters from the territorial and social bases of all political camps and from the growing group of non-voters.
As for the PD, it is quite hard not to consider it the biggest loser of the 2013 election. In spite of having gained a relative majority of the votes and the absolute majority of seats in one chamber, the PD lost the chance -with which it was so widely credited throughout the campaign -to win and govern alone. Bersani's deliberate choice to depersonalize the campaign was possibly crucial in this respect. Indeed, the failure of the PD campaign can be interpreted as a further testimony of the longstanding lack of understanding on behalf of the Italian left of the importance of personalization when it comes to voters' behavior. The unexpected electoral success of Berlusconi's PdL further strengthens this contention. Through his aggressive and highly personalized campaign, he got (once more) extremely close to winning the majority of seats in the Chamber. As in 2006, part of such success is to be attributed to Berlusconi's extensively popular position on the tax issue and in particular on the property tax (IMU). However, a more comprehensive account of the election result cannot avoid taking into account the blend of rational issues and personal charisma that surrounds Silvio Berlusconi's political success in the last two decades (Bellucci et al. 2013) . Through the personal return in the media field, and the sudden re-emergence of his party, Berlusconi proved wrong those (see, e.g., Fabbrini 2012) who enthusiastically believed that the technicalities of policy could permanently harm the personalization of politics. 
